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Abstract Social stigma can effectively prevent people from going out and
possibly spreading COVID-19. Using the framework of replicator dynamics,
this study analyzes the interaction between self-restraint behavior, infection
with viruses such as COVID-19, and stigma against going out. We show that
a non-legally binding policy reduces the number of people going out in the
steady state. Our comparative static analysis suggests that intensifying the
stigma cost does not necessarily reduce the number of players going out be-
cause of an indirect effect of from a decrease in infection risk. The social welfare
analysis suggests that the level of population share of players going out in the
interior equilibrium is larger than the socially optimal level without the state
of emergency, and it is the same under the state of emergency.
Keywords COVID-19 · Stigma · Self-restraint behavior · Non-pharmaceutical
interventions · Replicator dynamics
1 Introduction
As of October 2, 2020, more than 34 million people worldwide have contracted
the novel coronavirus infection (SARS-CoV-2), making it a true pandemic
(WHO, 2020). Countries around the world are implementing various policies
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to control the spread of the disease through trial and error. Specifically, govern-
ments are implementing policies to reduce the chance of contact with the dis-
ease in order to reduce the rate of infection. The following two types of policies
restrict behavior to prevent the spread of infectious diseases: legally enforce-
able behavioral restrictions with fines or punishments and non-legally binding
behavioral restrictions based on individual self-restraint, without penalties.
Policies enacted by several European countries and the United States have
implemented legally enforceable behavioral restrictions. The United States has
the highest number of cases worldwide as of October 2, 2020, with 7.4 million
infected and 211,000 dead (The COVID Tracking Project, 2020). New York
State, which declared a state of emergency on March 7, mandated in principle,
100% telecommuting starting March 22, on the governor’s order. Companies
can be fined up to 10,000 US dollars if they do not follow through and cause
severe physical harm to their employees. The state of public health emergency
imposed in France allows the Prime Minister, with the advice of the Minister
of Health, to immediately implement a series of restrictive measures appli-
cable throughout the country, which is a legally binding policy (France 24,
2020). Individuals who go out for purposes other than those authorized by
the government, such as the purchase of living essentials, are fined between
135—3,700 Euros. In Italy, where the number of COVID-19-related deaths is
at 35,968 as of October 2, 2020 (COVID-19 Situazione Italia, 2020), a decree
was passed on March 10, 2020, imposing a nationwide curfew, with penalties
of up to 3,000 Euros for those who do not carry a “certificate” stating the
place and reason they had to go out. In Spain, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez
ordered a “state of alarm,” which was legally binding on March 14 (AS, 2020).
Under the Spanish state of emergency, breachers were arrested or the fined
between 601 and 30,000 Euros.
In contrast, some countries, such as Japan and Sweden, imposed a non-
legally binding policy based on individual self-restraint, without enforcement.
In Japan, the government declared a state of emergency, which is not legally
binding, which significantly restrained people from going out. (The Japan
Times, 2020a; Kyodo News, 2020; Katafuchi et al., 2020). It is widely con-
sidered to have been more successful in controlling the number of infections
than in other OECD countries (Lu et al., 2020; Iwasaki and Grubaugh, 2020).
How many people in Japan refrain from going out under the non-binding dec-
laration of a state of emergency? To answer this question, we consider the
interaction between infection risk, stigma, and the player’s decision-making.
In Japan, the phenomenon of a “self-restraint police” (Jishuku Keisatsu in
Japanese) emerged under the state of emergency. The “self-restraint police” is
a colloquial term for ordinary citizens who crack down on or attack individuals
or shops that do not respond to government requests to refrain from going out
or doing business. They have posted expletives on the doors of restaurants
open for business and scratched cars with out-of-prefecture plates (The Japan
Times, 2020c,b). The self-restraint police symbolize the stigma against those
who do not comply with requests for self-restraint. This suggests that even
unenforceable policies can discourage people from going out, to avoid social
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stigma. We apply an evolutionary game to analyze self-restraint behavior in
the context of infectious disease epidemics from a stigmatization perspective.
Research on stigma has evolved around social psychology (Major et al.,
2018) and sociology, beginning with the discussion by Goffman (1963). For ex-
ample, Lieberman et al. (2012) explored whether the relation between disgust
sensitivity and stigma of obesity is specific to pathogen disgust, or whether
sexual and moral disgust are also associated with negative attitudes toward
obese people. There are also several studies on stigma in economics, Moffitt
(1983); Besley and Coate (1992); Bhargava and Manoli (2015) study welfare
stigma (Lindbeck et al., 1999; Kurita et al., 2020; Itaya and Kurita, 2020),
Rasmusen (1996) analyzes the stigma related to criminal record, Kim (2003)
analyzes the stigma against tax evasion, and Ennis and Weinberg (2013) inves-
tigate financial stigma. It is important to analyze stigma in terms of going-out
behavior during an infectious disease epidemic, as it may play a similar role in
the fear of infection. We suppose that the psychological costs of stigma inten-
sify under a declared state of emergency in the model. Consequently, we show
that the number of people going out in the steady state under the declared
state of emergency is less than the number without it.
Several empirical studies analyze the effect of Japan’s non-legally enforce-
able emergency declarations (Kobayashi et al., 2020; Katafuchi et al., 2020;
Yamamura and Tsutsui, 2020). Kobayashi et al. (2020) show that the dec-
laration and extension of the state of emergency has achieved some success
in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic. Other studies analyze the effect of a
legally binding lockdown on the economy (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Alvarez et al.,
2020; Eichenbaum et al., 2020; Farboodi et al., 2020; Gharehgozli et al., 2020;
Holtemöller, 2020; Mandel and Veetil, 2020; Martin et al., 2020). Acemoglu
et al. (2020) and Alvarez et al. (2020) discuss the optimal lockdown policy
using the theoretical model. Mandel and Veetil (2020) estimate the costs of a
lockdown in some sectors of the global economy using a multi-sector model.
We present an investigation of the evolutionary model, specifically, the
replicator dynamics of self-restraint behavior when stigma and the risk of
infection change with the number of players going out. Evolutionary game
and replicator dynamics are widely studied and applied in economics (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978; Henrich, 2009; Wilson et al., 2009; Garćıa and van den
Bergh, 2011; Safarzyńska and Van den Bergh, 2011; Cerqueti et al., 2013;
Wood et al., 2016; Shi et al., 2017; Wu, 2018; Yang et al., 2018; Wu, 2019;
Alger et al., 2020; Norman, 2020). Taylor and Jonker (1978) was the first to
model replicator dynamics, which has since been applied in many fields and for
various issues. For instance, Safarzyńska and Van den Bergh (2011) analyzed
technological change using replicator dynamics, Cerqueti et al. (2013) and
Shi et al. (2017) consider a dynamic perspective of economic interactions and
social tolerance applying it, and Itaya and Kurita (2020) analyze the replicator
dynamics of taking-up behavior in welfare programs.
Although the number of studies on COVID-19 is increasing, few studies
consider stigma. One of the few exceptions is Katafuchi et al. (2020). They
analyzed the theoretical model with stigma and infection risk and empirically
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tested the theoretical results using mobility data. However, they consider in-
fection risk as exogenous, and this assumption is strict. Moreover, their model
defines the fixed point of the number of players going out as an equilibrium
point. This means that all players are rational enough to calculate each payoff
and expect the number of players going out at least in equilibrium. Finally,
they analyze the static model; however, the situation in a pandemic changes
drastically change over time.
This study contributes in the following ways. First, we endogenize both
stigma cost and infection risk, and weaken the rationality that players attain
equilibrium using replicator dynamics, to beyond three concerns in the pre-
vious research mentioned here. Second, we show that the state of emergency
has an effect on players’ self-restraint behavior in the steady state. Third, our
comparative static analysis indicates that intensifying the stigma cost does not
necessarily induce the reduction in the number of players going out. Fourth,
the social welfare analysis indicates that the number of players going out is
larger than the socially optimal level without/under the state of emergency.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Sections 2 and 3, we present the ba-
sic setting of the model and the replicator dynamics. Section 4 investigates
whether the non-legally binding policy induces self-restraint behavior. Section
5 presents the results of the comparative statics. Section 6 includes the welfare
analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy with a population of N economic agents. For sim-
plicity, we assume N to be constant in time. There are two actions or strategy
types: Going-out and Staying-home. Let x(t) be the share of going-out players
in the total population at time t.
Table 1 Payoff Matrix
Going Staying home
Going (πGG, πGG) (πGS , πSG)
Staying home (πSG, πGS) (πSS , πSS)
Let us suppose that agents play the game represented in Table 1 after
random matching. In Table 1, πaiaj corresponds to player i’s payoff when
player i’s action is ai and player j’s action is aj , where ai, aj ∈ {G,S}, G is
an abbreviation for “Going out” and S is for “Staying home.” Each payoff,
πGG, πGS , πSG, and πSS , is set as follows:
πGG = πGS = uout − γ(x)c− σs(x), (1)
πSG = πSS = uhome. (2)
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Here, x is the proportion of players going out to the total population, uout
is the utility from going out, uhome is the utility from staying home, γ(x)c is
the subjective expected cost of infection with the virus, γ(x) is the subjective
probability of infection with the virus, c is the cost of infection with the virus,
σs(x) is the stigma cost of going out, σ is the relative size of stigma cost to
infection cost, s(x) is the stigma cost function. We assume that the subjec-
tive probability of infection with the virus is an increasing function with the
proportion of players going out in the total population as follows:
γ(x) = ηx, (3)
where η(> 0) is the parameter indicating the degree of increase in the subjec-
tive probability of infection of more people going out. Moreover, we assume
that the stigma cost is a decreasing function with the proportion of players
going out in the total population as follows:
s(x) = ζ0 − ζ1x, (4)
where ζ0(> 0) is the fixed stigma cost, ζ1x is the flexible stigma cost, and
ζ1(> 0) is the degree of stigma reduction of more people going out. This
formulation of stigma cost is based on Lindbeck et al. (1999) and Katafuchi
et al. (2020). We assume that s(1) = ζ0− ζ1 > 0. This assumption means that
the lowest level of stigma cost is not zero and positive.
3 Replicator dynamics
Next, we show the replicator dynamics of the population share of players going
out in the model. To achieve this, we need to check the expected payoff of each
strategy. The expected payoff of going out and staying home are, respectively:
E[G] = xπGG + (1− x)πGS , (5)
and
E[S] = xπSG + (1− x)πSS . (6)
We model the replicator dynamics of the going-out share in the total pop-
ulation by the following differential equation:
ẋ = x(1− x)(E[G] − E[S]). (7)
Substituting Equations (1) and (2) into Equation (8), we can transform Equa-
tion (7) as follows:
ẋ = x(1− x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− σs(x)] . (8)
We derive the stationary point in the dynamics by solving (8), ẋ = 0, as
follows:
x∗ = 0, x̂, 1, (9)
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where
x̂ =
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
. (10)
The condition for the interior stationary point is given, as shown in Lemma
1.
Lemma 1 The necessary and sufficient condition for x̂ ∈ (0, 1), is given by
σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ σ(ζ0 − ζ1) (11)
Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
The stability analysis presents us with the following results:
Proposition 1 The stability analysis and Lemma 1 presents us with the fol-
lowing results: The interior stationary point x∗ = x̂ is uniquely stable and
x∗ = 0, 1 is unstable under the following condition:
ηc > σζ1 (C.1)
Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
Proposition 1 suggests that the interior steady state, x̂, is stable when it
exists. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the population share of players going
out and stationary points. There are three stationary points, x∗ = 0, x̂, 1. We
can confirm that x∗ = x̂ is stable and x∗ = 0, 1 are unstable, as Figure 1
shows.
4 Effect of the non-legally binding state of emergency
Our aim is to investigate the effect of the non-legally binding policy on the
stationary point. We introduce the policy variable ι ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
πGG = πGS = uout − γ(x)c− (1 + ρι)σs(x), (12)
where ι is the indicator variable of the state of emergency and ρ > 0 is a
parameter that expresses the amplification of stigma by the state of emergency.
Therefore, this setting implies that stigma costs are enhanced by (1+ρ) times
more under the state of emergency than they would otherwise be. Let x̂1 denote
the interior stationary point under the state of emergency and x̂0 without the
state of emergency. x̂0 is equal to the right-hand side of (10) because x̂ = x̂0.
The stationary points without the state of emergency are given as follows:
x∗ = 0, x̂0, 1, (13)
where
x̂0 =
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
. (14)
COVID-19 and stigma 7










Fig. 1 Steady states without the state of emergency
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of x with parameters as follows:
uout = 1, uhome = 0.05, η = 1, c = 1.5,σ = 0.5, ζ0 = 0.5, and ζ1 = 0.25.
We can derive the stationary point under the state of emergency as follows:
x∗ = 0, x̂1, 1, (15)
where
x̂1 =
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
. (16)
The condition for the interior stationary point to exist under the state of
emergency is given as shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The necessary and sufficient condition in order that x̂ι=1 ∈ (0, 1)
under the state of emergency is given by
(1 + ρ)σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1). (17)
Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 2 shows that the conditions for the existence of the interior sta-
tionary point under the non-legally binding state of emergency is similar to
that in 1.
The stability analysis at the stationary points under the state of emergency
presents the following results:
Proposition 2 Under the state of emergency, the interior stationary point
x∗ = x̂1 is uniquely stable and x
∗ = 0, 1 is unstable under the following condi-
tion:
ηc > (1 + ρ)σζ1 (C.2)
Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2 shows that the interior stationary point is stable and other
stationary points are unstable, although there are three stationary points,
x∗ = 0, x̂1, 1, as in Proposition 1. From Proposition 1 and 2, we need to
compare each interior stationary point to consider the effect of the non-legal
policy as the state of emergency.
We obtain the following proposition about the effects of the state of emer-
gency.
Proposition 3 The state of emergency, which is a non-legally binding policy,
has the effect of restraining the player’s going-out behavior, that is, x̂1−x̂0 < 0,
under the following condition:




Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3 suggests that a declaration of a state of emergency that is
not legally binding discourages people from going out, which is consistent with
the results in Japan that the number of people who go out reduces significantly
under a state of emergency.
Figure 2 shows the numerical plot of the evolution of x with and without
the non-legally binding state of emergency. The stable interior stationary point
uniquely exists in each evolution. We can visually confirm that x̂1 is lower than
x̂0, that is, the non-legally binding state of emergency can reduce the share of
going-out players through self-restraint behavior.
The condition (C.3) in Proposition 3 means that the state of emergency is
effective when the gain from going out is low, fixed stigma cost is high, degree
of stigma reduction of players going out is higher, cost of infection is high, and
the degree of increase in the subjective probability of infection of more players
going out is high.
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Fig. 2 Effect of the state of emergency
Notes: The figure shows the numerical plot of ẋ|ι=0 drawn by solid line and
ẋ|ι=1 drawn by dash line with parameters as follows: uout = 1, uhome = 0.05,
η = 1, c = 1.5, σ = 0.5, ζ0 = 0.5, ζ1 = 0.25, ρ = 1.5.
5 Comparative static analysis
We conduct a comparative static analysis to investigate the impact of varying
each parameter (uout, uhome, η, c, σ, ρ, ζ0, and ζ1) on the equilibrium number
of players going out. We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Results in the comparative static analysis are given as follows:
1. An increase in the utility from going out (uout) raises the equilibrium share
of players going out in the total population under the state of emergency
and without it.
2. An increase in the utility from staying home (uhome) reduces the equilib-
rium share of players going out in the total population under the state of
emergency and without it.
3. An increase in the degree of rise in the subjective probability of infection of
more people going out (η) reduces the equilibrium share of players going
out in the total population under the state of emergency and without it.
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4. An increase in the cost of infection (c) reduces the equilibrium share of
players going out in the total population under the state of emergency and
without it.
5. An increase in the relative size of stigma (σ) reduces or increases the
equilibrium share of players going out in the total population under the
state of emergency and without it.
6. An increase in the degree of stigma amplified by the state of emergency (ρ)
reduces or increases the equilibrium share of players going out in the
total population under the state of emergency whereas it does not affect
the share without the state of emergency.
7. An increase in the fixed stigma cost (ζ0) reduces the equilibrium share of
players going out in the total population under the state of emergency and
without it.
8. An increase in the degree of stigma reduction of more people going out (ζ1)
raises the equilibrium share of players going out in the total population
under the state of emergency and without it.
Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
Most of the results of Proposition 4 are consistent with our supposition.
In fact, an increase in the utility from going out (uout) and the degree of
stigma reduction of more people going out (ζ1) raise the number of players
going out, because the incentive to go out increases. In contrast, an increase
in the utility from staying home (uhome), degree of increase in the subjective
probability of infection of more people going out (η), cost of infection (c), and
the fixed stigma cost (ζ0), reduce the number of players going out, because
the incentive to go out decreases.
However, an increase in the relative size of stigma σ and the degree of
stigma amplified by the state of emergency ρ can raise or reduce the number
of players going out, although intuitively it reduces that. This result arises
from the indirect effect that occurs through the channel as follows: First,
intensifying the stigma cost reduces the number of players going out. Second,
a decrease in players going out reduces infection risk, and finally, players have
an incentive to go out from the weakening infection risk.
6 Welfare analysis
We now conduct the welfare analysis. Let W denote social welfare, which is
given by
W = xE[G] + (1− x)E[S],
= x [uout − γ(x)c− (1 + ιρ)σs(x)] + (1− x)uhome,
= x [uout − ηcx− (1 + ιρ)σ (ζ0 − ζ1x)] + (1− x)uhome. (18)
Let xopt denote the socially optimal level of population share of players
going out. The following proposition presents the relationship between the
equilibrium level and the socially optimal level of x:
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Proposition 5 The interior equilibrium level of the population share of play-
ers going out is larger than the socially optimal level without/under the state
of emergency, that is, x̂0 > x
opt
0 , x̂1 > x
opt
1 .
Proof See Appendix. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5 suggests that the level of population share of players going
out in the interior equilibrium is larger than the socially optimal level without
the state of emergency, and it is the same under the state of emergency. The
existence of externality in the model generates these results. Infection risk is
assumed to be the increasing function with respect to the population share of
going-out players and stigma is assumed to be the decreasing function. That
is, an increase in the number of people going out creates a negative externality
of higher risk of infection and a positive externality of weaker stigma. Because
each player considers the externalities for individual level, the equilibrium
population share of players going out is excessive compared to the socially
optimal level.
7 Conclusion
This study analyzes the interaction between self-restraint behavior, infection
risk, and stigma against going out during a pandemic, using replicator dynam-
ics. Consequently, the population share of going-out players has three steady
states, as follows: x∗ = 0, x̂, 1; however, the interior stationary point, x̂, is only
stable (Proposition 1). We show that the non-legally binding policy reduces
the number of people going out in the steady state by intensifying stigma costs
(Proposition 3). This result is consistent with the empirical result in Katafuchi
et al. (2020). Our comparative static analysis indicates that intensifying the
stigma cost does not necessarily induce the reduction in the number of players
going out because of the indirect effect of the decrease in infection risk (Propo-
sition 4). This suggests the policy implication that possibly, intensifying social
pressure cannot reduce going-out behavior. Finally, the welfare analysis shows
that the number of players going out is larger than the socially optimal level
without/under the state of emergency (Proposition 5).
This study does not take into account any self-restraint on the part of
suppliers, such as restaurants. However, the “self-restraint police” stigmatized
not only people outdoors but also restaurants operating in a declared state
of emergency. We will need to analyze supply-side and household restraint
behavior and for changes in the number of people infected and the economy.
Our model assumes that stigma cost and infection risk are linear functions
with respect to the population share of people going out. We will give their
functions a micro-foundation for future work.
Social stigma is important in the fight against COVID-19 because it reduces
the spread of infection through individual self-restraint behavior. However, we
must be vigilant of the negative side of stigma or social pressures, because, as
history shows, extreme stigmatization can lead to discrimination, prejudice,
and violence.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof First, the condition for x̂ is positive is given by
x̂ > 0,
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
> 0,
uout − uhome − σζ0 > 0,
Hence,
uout − uhome > σζ0. (19)
Second, the condition for x̂ is less than 1 is given by
x̂ < 1,
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
< 1,
uout − uhome − σζ0 < ηc− σζ1,
Thus,
uout − uhome < ηc+ σ(ζ0 − ζ1). (20)
From Conditions (19) and (20), the necessary and sufficient condition in order
that x̂ ∈ (0, 1) is given by
σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ σ(ζ0 − ζ1).
⊓⊔
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof We use the linear approximation method to check the stability in the
stationary point. Differentiating ẋ with respect to x yields the following result:
dẋ
dx
= (1− 2x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− σs(x)]− x(1− x) [γ
′(x)c+ σs′(x)] .
(21)
First, we check the stability condition for x∗ = 0. Substituting x∗ = 0 into








= uout − uhome − σζ0. (22)
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Thus, the stationary point x∗ = 0 is stable if uout − uhome < σζ0 and is
otherwise unstable.
Second, we check the stability condition for x∗ = x̂. Substituting x∗ = x̂








= −x̂(1− x̂) [ηc− σζ1] . (23)
The sign of (23) is negative when ηc > σζ1. Thus, the stationary point x
∗ = x1
is stable.
Third, we confirm the stability condition for x∗ = 1. Substituting x∗ = 1








= − [uout − uhome − ηc− σ(ζ0 − ζ1)] . (24)
Hence, the stationary point x∗ = 1 is stable if uout−uhome > ηc+σ(ζ0−ζ1) and
unstable otherwise. Summing up the above stability conditions and Lemma
1, we conclude that the interior steady state x∗ = x̂ is uniquely stable and
x∗ = 0, 1 are unstable if an interior steady state exists. ⊓⊔
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof First, the condition for x̂ is positive is given by
x̂ι=1 > 0,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
> 0,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 > 0,
Hence,
uout − uhome > (1 + ρ)σζ0. (25)
Second, the condition for x̂ is less than 1 is given by
x̂ι=1 < 1,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
< 1,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 < ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1,
Thus,
uout − uhome < ηc+ (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1). (26)
From Conditions (25) and (26), the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure
that x̂ι=1 ∈ (0, 1) is given by
(1 + ρ)σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1).
⊓⊔
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof We use the linear approximation method to investigate the stability
at the stationary point. The replicator dynamics of the population share of
players going out is given by
ẋ|ι=1 = x(1− x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− (1 + ρ)σs(x)] . (27)
Differentiating (27) with respect to x yields the following result:
dẋ
dx
= (1− 2x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− (1 + ρ)σs(x)]− x(1− x) [γ
′(x)c+ (1 + ρ)σs′(x)] .
(28)
First, we check the stability condition for x∗ = 0. Substituting x∗ = 0 into








= uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0. (29)
Thus, the stationary point x∗ = 0 is stable if uout − uhome < (1+ ρ)σζ0 and is
otherwise unstable.
Second, we check the stability condition for x∗ = x̂1. Substituting x
∗ = x̂1








= −x̂ι=1(1− x̂ι=1) [ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1] . (30)
The sign of (30) is negative when ηc > (1 + ρ)σζ1. Thus, the stationary point
x∗ = x̂1 is stable.
Third, we confirm the stability condition for x∗ = 1. Substituting x∗ = 1








= − [uout − uhome − ηc− (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1)] . (31)
Hence, the stationary point x∗ = 1 is stable if uout−uhome > (1+ρ)ηc+σ(ζ0−
ζ1) and unstable otherwise. By summing up the above stability conditions and
Lemma 2, we conclude that the interior steady state x∗ = x̂1 is uniquely stable
and x∗ = 0, 1 are unstable if an interior steady state exists. ⊓⊔
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof The difference between x̂1 and x̂0 is given as follows:
x̂1 − x̂0 =
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
−
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
, (32)
From (32), the condition for x̂1 − x̂0 < 0 is given by
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof 1. We investigate the effect of an increase in the utility from going
out in the equilibrium. The effect on the equilibrium under the state of





ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
> 0, (34)








2. The effect of an increase in the utility from staying home on the equilibrium





ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
< 0, (36)








3. The effect of an increase in the degree of rise in the subjective probability
of infection of more people going out on the equilibrium under the state of




c [uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 < 0, (38)





c [uout − uhome − σζ0]
(ηc− σζ1)
2 < 0. (39)
4. The effect of an increase in the cost of infection on the equilibrium under




η [uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 < 0, (40)





η [uout − uhome − σζ0]
(ηc− σζ1)
2 < 0. (41)
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5. The effect of an increase in the relative size of stigma on the equilibrium





ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
+
[uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0] (1 + ρ)ζ1
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 R 0,
(42)








(uout − uhome − σζ0) ζ1
(ηc− σζ1)
2 R 0. (43)
6. The effect of an increase in the degree of stigma amplified by the state






ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
+
[uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]σζ1
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 R 0, (44)





7. The effect of an increase in the fixed stigma cost on the equilibrium under





ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
< 0, (46)








8. The effect of an increase in the degree of stigma reduction of more people





(1 + ρ)σ [uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 > 0, (48)





σ [uout − uhome − σζ0]
(ηc− σζ1)
2 > 0. (49)
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof Substituting ι = 0 into Equation (18), we obtain the following:
W (x)|ι=0 = x [uout − ηcx− σ (ζ0 − ζ1x)] + (1− x)uhome. (50)
The first order condition and the second order condition are given by
dW (x)|ι=0
dx
= uout − uhome − σζ0 + 2(σζ1 − ηc)x, (51)
d2W (x)|ι=0
dx2
= 2(σζ1 − ηc) < 0. (52)
The socially optimal level of population share of going-out players without the




uout − uhome − σζ0
2 [ηc− σζ1]
<
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
= x̂0. (53)
Next, substituting ι = 1 into Equation (18), we obtain the following:
W (x)|ι=1 = x [uout − ηcx− (1 + ρ)σ (ζ0 − ζ1x)] + (1− x)uhome. (54)
The first order condition and the second order condition are given by
dW (x)|ι=1
dx
= uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 + 2 [(1 + ρ)σζ1 − ηc]x, (55)
d2W (x)|ι=1
dx2
= 2 [(1 + ρ)σζ1 − ηc]x < 0. (56)
The socially optimal level of population share of players going out under the




uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
2 [ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
<
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
= x̂1. (57)
⊓⊔
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